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Chapter 6
Advice in Deﬁned Contribution Plans
Gordon L. Clark, Maurizio Fiaschetti, and Peter Tufano
Deﬁned contribution (DC) pension plan participants are often encouraged
to seek advice so as to fashion saving strategies that take into account their
goals and objectives, expected income, and risk tolerance over the short and
long terms (North 2015). To the extent that DC plan participants seek
advice on these issues, it is widely believed that they begin with friends and
relatives, perhaps augmented by the Internet and websites (depending on
age and gender; see Clark et al. 2014). These sources may not be as helpful
as need be; indeed, what peers say and do can drive participants in different
directions (Beshears et al. 2015). In many OECD countries, participants’
need for advice is often fulﬁlled by governments and commercial vendors.
For instance, governments can distribute information for retirement plan-
ning, maintain interactive websites, and encourage awareness of the issues.
Few commentators suggest these efforts have been particularly effective (UK
Government 2008).
Whether ﬁnancial advisors can be trusted to act on behalf of their clients
and whether ﬁnancial advisors are able and/or willing to assume responsi-
bility for their advice are key academic and policy issues (Campbell et al.
2011; Gabaix and Laibson 2006). At the same time, it is apparent that little is
known of the nature and scope of the demand for advice by the full range of
DC plan participants. In part, this is because many DC plans, especially those
in the private sector, have low rates of participation by low-paid employees.
Also, in many jurisdictions, DC plan participants tend to search for and
select their own advisors. Where advisors are not trusted and/or come at a
price, it appears participants are often reluctant to seek advice. In this
chapter, we focus on the provision of retirement advice where the provider
acts in the interests of participants.
Four issues are of interest. First, we investigate the timing of advice-seeking
by DC plan participants as they approach the median age of retirement.
Second, we distinguish between advice-seeking in general and advice-seeking
relevant to retirement planning, assessing whether participants’ advice-
seeking on this issue is a distinctive class of advice-seeking. Third, we test
whether advice-seeking is responsive to events and macroeconomic trends.
Fourth, we assess the patterns of advice-seeking as participants approach
the median retirement age by reference to participants’ age, gender,
account balance, and salary. We rely upon a large database of Australian DC
pension plan participants involving approximately 560,000 participants
over ten years.1
The administrator provides advice without requiring the payment of a fee
by the participant in circumstances where the advisor is incentivized to help
the participant without regard to the sponsor or other service providers.
This chapter begins with an overview of recent behavioral research that
suggests the context in which planning takes place is important (Clark 2014).
Thereafter, we introduce the data on advice-seeking, noting the distinctive
attributes of the Australian system of mandatory DC pension saving. This is
followed by an account of the topics raised by pension plan participants when
seeking advice from their multi-employer pension plan administrator. Tests
of robustness are used to justify categorical distinctions between advice
sought on administrative matters, investment, and retirement planning. We
show that advice-seeking on retirement planning comes to dominate other
forms of advice-seeking as plan participants approach the Australian median
age of retirement. In the concluding section of the chapter, implications are
drawn for the design of DC pension schemes and public policy.
Saving for Retirement
Like many cognitive scientists and decision-theorists, we accept that human
beings look to the future and/or recognize the virtues of planning for the
future; that is, planning for the future is a human trait (Bratman 1987).
Whether people are effective planners is more problematic, however. The
issue is one of competence in relation to the environment in which they
must make decisions and take actions (Clark et al. 2006). For instance, some
environments may be benign and/or rewarding when planning for the
future, whereas other environments may be so unstable that making plans
and acting on behalf of long-term expectations is self-defeating. In a related
vein, Simon (1982) has argued that whereas most people are intendedly
rational, their best intentions may be confounded by unexpected changes in
the environment (Gabaix et al. 2006).
The extent to which people value the future, how they deal with possible
losses as opposed to possible gains in welfare, and how they adapt to new
information, are just three topics among many that represent the focus of
behavioral research (Ainslie 2012; Baron 2008). In the context of risk and
uncertainty, it has been shown that, on average, people either discount the
long term or discount the immediate future but attribute value in the long
term (Laibson 1997). Likewise, it has been shown that, on average, people are
more concerned with a possible loss in welfare than they are willing to assume
risk to achieve higher well-being. Moreover, many people procrastinate,
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leaving to the last minute decisions that they must or should take, yet some
people more than others overreact to new information and can arbitrarily
change their plans for the future (see Kahneman 2011).
Lusardi and Mitchell (2007, 2011) suggested that saving for the future
requires more than being an effective decision-maker; it also requires know-
ledge of the principles underpinning ﬁnancial planning. They have identi-
ﬁed a set of skills relevant to long-term ﬁnancial decision making and tested
respondents at home and abroad in terms of their competence. The results
show that ﬁnancial literacy varies by age, gender, education, and income.
Such patterns in ﬁnancial literacy cut against the plausibility of representing
individual retirement planning as simply the expression of well-founded
intention and commitment. At issue is whether high levels of ﬁnancial
literacy can reinforce saving for the future and reasoned adaptation to
changing circumstances, versus whether low levels of ﬁnancial literacy dis-
courage those concerned from making plans for the future.
Saving for retirement is an especially demanding problem (Zeckhauser
2010). At one level, it involves making forward estimates of one’s job tenure,
value of human capital, and health and welfare. It also involves making
forward estimates of the risk-adjusted rate of return on contributions to a
pension saving plan which, in turn, involves making forward estimates of the
relative value of plausible long-term investment strategies. For younger
workers who face considerable uncertainty as to their long-term job pros-
pects, the rate of return on their education, and longevity, elicit a variety of
responses including procrastination and status quo bias (Samuelson and
Zeckhauser 1988). Older workers face less uncertainty on these factors and
may be more effective at planning for the future because the planning
horizon is better deﬁned. Saving for retirement would be more effective if
younger workers could imagine themselves as older workers with all the
beneﬁts of hindsight. Quite obviously, this is highly problematic.
For these reasons, the average worker may be ill-equipped to make plans
for the future. Younger workers may need guidance in framing long-term
expectations, and older workers may not have the skills and expertise to take
advantage of their accumulated savings and make investments that can
generate sustainable incomes. Further, the ﬁndings from behavioral
research as regards the pervasiveness of decision making biases and anom-
alies suggest that leaving responsibility for retirement saving to individuals is
likely to result in lower social welfare.
Demand for and Supply of Advice
Given their lack of skills and expertise, pension plan participants may, on
their own account, reach out for advice. It is widely assumed that the average
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participant begins with family and friends, work colleagues, and/or third
parties who are known to them. It is reasonable to suppose that the advice
provided by family and friends may do little more than reinforce expect-
ations. Whether colleagues and the work environment are useful ways
through which to learn about saving for the future appears to depend
upon factors speciﬁc to the workplace, such as the heterogeneity of fellow
employees (negative) and the engagement of the employer (positive). In
some jurisdictions, trusted third parties can include employers and local
bank employees.
Advice-seeking from third parties would seem to be confounded by two
intersecting factors. First, just as pension plan participants may lack the skills
and expertise to be effective long-term planners, they may also lack the skills
and expertise to search for and assess the relative merits of competing advice
providers. That is, the cognitive biases and anomalies that discount effective
decision making in the context of risk and uncertainty also apply when
searching for providers and choosing amongst service providers.2 Second,
those offering advice may do so by proclaiming their independence and
trustworthiness while concealing their ties to vendors of ﬁnancial services
and the true cost of their services. In the vernacular of economic theory,
asymmetric information confounds the search for and selection of advice
providers (Akerlof 1970; Spence 1977; Gabaix et al. 2006).
More generally, little is known about the demand for advice in circum-
stances where participants trust the advice provider without pressures to
take proffered advice and related products. It would also be helpful to know
more about the nature and scope of advice sought when the participant
does not directly pay either the plan sponsor or the third-party provider of
advice. Academics, consultants, and policymakers tend to treat advice rele-
vant to saving for retirement as distinctive, but it is not obvious that pension
plan participants carry with them a robust classiﬁcation system that distin-
guishes, for example, insurance products from retirement savings products.
As such, it is important to understand better the nature and range of topics
raised by participants and whether it is reasonable to suppose that seeking
advice in this domain is distinctly different from those issues raised when
seeking ﬁnancial advice (in general).
Evidence from behavioral psychology and economics suggests that people
are more likely to seek advice when their material circumstances and/or
expectations change in unanticipated ways (Harvey 2012). In this respect,
uncertainty as regards the future may result in participants being unable to
assess the impact of possible future events, or to assign probabilistic esti-
mates of their likelihood in ways that inform savings behavior. This does
not necessarily mean that any unexpected change in their material cir-
cumstances would prompt reconsideration of plans and, possibly, advice-
seeking. Such events would have to be signiﬁcant in relation to competing
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claims on their attention, since people have limited cognitive resources.
This may have two related effects: people could seek advice to compensate
for their previous lack of attention, and people could seek advice because
changes in their material circumstances trigger attention to the planning
process.
On a related issue, Sharpe (2007: 11) has observed that ‘investors differ in
geographic location, homeownership, profession, and so forth. We term
these aspects an individual’s position. If two people have different positions
they may wish to hold different portfolios. Similarly people may have differ-
ent feelings about risk, present versus future gratiﬁcation, and so on. We
term these an individual’s preferences.’ When the Australian Bureau of
Statistics (2011) asked a representative sample of Australians about their
retirement incomes, a signiﬁcant minority of retired women indicated that
the main source of funds for meeting living costs came from their partners’
incomes. Likewise, when women intending to retire were asked about their
sources of expected income, they indicated that they would rely on their
partners’ incomes, especially when the women were younger. By contrast,
male retirees and near-retirees indicated a much lower propensity to rely
upon their partners’ income.
In essence, an individual’s age, gender, household situation, and employ-
ment experience can systematically affect advice-seeking relevant to saving
for retirement. The timing and volume of advice sought, the topics raised
at any point in time and over time, and the relationship between the
nature and scope of advice sought and the participants’ expectations of
retirement income are key issues to building an understanding of the
demand for advice. If individual preferences are not constant over time,
changing in response to life cycle factors and situational imperatives,
including commitments and reliance upon others, then long-term plans
may well be discarded and advice sought about how to adapt to new
circumstances.
Advice, Retirement, and Events
In this chapter, we focus upon the advice offered by Mercer (Australia),
an administrator of more than 120 corporate pension plans. Mercer
provides advice via a call center and Internet facility, where those
employed to advise participants have no incentive other than to ‘help’
the participant in a timely manner (Clark et al. 2014).3 Participants seek-
ing advice about their pension accounts are dealt with immediately and
directly. Should they also seek advice about ﬁnancial planning involving
other ﬁnancial instruments, they are passed to more qualiﬁed Mercer
ﬁnancial advisors. Industry super funds are not-for-proﬁt organizations
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and widely advertise this as a virtue (Association of Superannuation Funds
of Australia 2014). In this case, the plan administrator is a commercial
entity but it mimics the service ethic of industry superannuation funds.
The provision of advice is subject to regulation by the Australian govern-
ment and its agencies.4
Advice Facility
The Mercer database includes information on participants’ age, gender,
postcodes, account balances, and whether (and when) they sought advice.
The call center was established in 2004 and is open ﬁve days a week, from
7 a.m. to 8 p.m. (Australian Eastern Standard Time). The web facility was
established in 2008 and it is accessible seven days a week. Mercer employs
approximately one hundred full-time and part-time advisors who handle
calls and web-based inquiries. The variance in advice-seeking is dominated
by the day-of-the-week effect, followed by a seasonal effect, and then
instances or events that may prompt groups of participants to seek advice.
The day-of-the-week effect is centered on Mondays and Tuesdays, and the
seasonal effect is centered on the run-up to the end of the ﬁnancial year
(June 30) with a signiﬁcant fallow period over December and January of each
year (Christmas holidays and vacation) (Clark et al. 2014).
Each call and web-based inquiry is logged and, where possible, the topic or
topics raised by the participant are identiﬁed and recorded. Over the period
2004–13, more than 140 topics were logged in the system. Some calls were
single-topic, whereas other calls were multi-topic in nature. The topics raised
fell into three broad categories: administrative matters, investment matters,
and retirement planning. Over the period 2004–13, administrative matters
dominated the call center and web-based facility; calls related to investment
matters and retirement planning together accounted for less than 50 percent
of all calls. The Mercer system recorded more than 1.5 million calls over the
period 2004–13, and approximately 2 million web-based inquiries over the
period 2008–13. Early on, the length of calls averaged 3.5 minutes. More
recently, calls have averaged 4.5 minutes.
Age of Retirement
Passed in 2004, the federal Age Discrimination Act (ADA) prohibits all
forms of direct and indirect discrimination based upon a person’s age. In
addition to federal legislation, Australian states and territories prohibit age
discrimination. Federal legislation covers private employees including those
working full-time, part-time, casually, and those employed on contract by
agencies and external providers. The ADA does not proscribe compulsory
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retirement at a certain age, although this is addressed in most states’ and
territories’ statutes. Federal statute treats compulsory retirement at a certain
age as an instance of age discrimination rather than an issue signiﬁcant in its
own right. Most public ofﬁcials and employees are subject to compulsory
retirement at a speciﬁc age.
Otherwise, there is no ofﬁcial age of retirement in Australia. Through the
period 2004–13, 65 years of age was the minimum age for a man or woman
to claim the Age Pension. Legislation passed in 2014 provided for a gradu-
ated increase in the minimum age from 65 to 67 years of age. The federal
government also regulates the ‘preservation age’, or the age at which
individuals can gain access to their superannuation assets. Recent legislation
has also provided for a graduated increase in the age to claim access to
superannuation assets from 55 to 60 years of age. As in many OECD coun-
tries, the Australian government has sought to encourage people to work
longer, both full-time and part-time.
Data on the retirement status and retirement intentions of the Australian
civilian population were provided by the Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS
2011). Statistics obtained from the federal government’s Multipurpose
Household Survey are used by the ABS to provide estimates for Australia
taking into account age, gender, and work status, whether in the labor force,
unemployed, or not in the workforce. Beginning with the 8.7 million civilian
population 45 years and over, it was estimated that 4.9 million were in the
labor force, of which 4.7 million were employed and 150,000 were
unemployed. Of the 3.8 million not in the labor force, it was estimated
that 3.2 million were retired. The ABS provided estimates of those retired by
gender and age cohort. Figure 6.1 shows that women had higher rates of
retirement in all but the oldest cohort of 70 years or more, being most
obvious during their 50s and early 60s. When surveyed, younger women
indicated that they would rely on their partners’ income for meeting the
living costs of retirement at a much higher rate than men who intended to
retire at much the same age.
The survey also asked men and women currently in the labor force to
estimate their intended age of retirement (Table 6.1). Those not in the
labor force included retirees, those not retired and intending to look for
either full-time or part-time work, and those who had never worked. Com-
paring age (cohort) and gender with respect to the intended age of retire-
ment, there was little difference in the average age of intended retirement
reported by respondents. Middle-aged cohorts (e.g., 45–9 years and 50–4
years) tended to report a slightly lower average expected age of retirement
(61–3 years) than older-age cohorts (e.g., 55–9 years and 60–4 years) (63–5
years). As noted previously, public policy provides incentives to work
through to one’s 60s. Nonetheless, a large proportion of the population is
retired by age 65.
102 Financial Decision Making and Retirement Security
Global Financial Crisis
Midway through the period 2004–13, the global ﬁnancial crisis erupted,
drastically affecting the ﬁnancial stability and economic performance of
many OECD countries. The US and the UK were particularly adversely
affected, prompting high rates of unemployment, high rates of household
indebtedness, and a plunge in stock market performance not seen since
the Great Depression of the 1930s. Economic recovery thereafter has been
protracted and uneven. The response of individuals and households to the
crisis has been a signiﬁcant topic for academics and policymakers (Akerlof
et al. 2014).
In the Australian case, the impact of the global ﬁnancial crisis was
‘remarkably mild by the standards of previous Australian recessions’ and
other OECD countries (Edey 2009; Eslake 2009). Likewise, the downturn in
the Australian stock market (2008–9) was short-lived, with a rapid recovery
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Figure 6.1. Australian rates of retirement by age and sex
Source: Australian Bureau of Statistics (2011).
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to higher levels of performance. It can be hypothesized that the global crisis
affected short-term expectations and behavior especially by those whomight
otherwise have retired. Gerrans (2012) found that the stock market down-
turn had only a modest effect on the trading activity of superannuation plan
participants. Those who did respond were older women with relatively large
account balances, rather than men.
Advice-Seeking: Timing and Patterns
Using these data we study patterns of retirement planning over the short
term and the long term. A cluster analysis was used to sort the topics
identiﬁed by call-handlers at the Mercer call center over the period
TABLE . Relationship between call volume by topics and macroeconomic factors
Administrative Investment Retirement
planning
% change stock mkt 1.638 0.416 0.923
(1.483) (0.722) (0.855)
% Δ gdp –2.275 –1.702 –10.860
(10.379) (5.383) (6.638)
% Δ full_time_employed 35.073 32.688** 27.413*
(19.100) (9.386) (11.366)
% Δ expectation of ﬁnancial situation –1.194 –0.851 –0.772
next 12 months (1.236) (0.587) (0.689)
% Δ expectation of economic 0.004 1.146 0.970
conditions next 12 months (0.816) (0.621) (0.763)
% Δ expectation of economic 2.087 –0.894 –1.034
conditions next 5 years (1.438) (1.008) (1.212)
% Δ unemployment expectations 1.753 0.842 0.733
(1.194) (0.824) (0.820)
Year ﬁxed effects YES YES YES
_cons –0.050 0.239* 0.111
(0.238) (0.109) (0.135)
sigma
_cons 0.242*** 0.123*** 0.144***
(0.040) (0.020) (0.026)
N 32 32 32
Notes: ‘Sigma_cons’ is the regression’s estimated standard error. *p < 0.10, **p < 0.05,
***p < 0.010.
Source: Authors’ elaboration of Mercer’s data and data from the Australian Bureau of Statistics
and the Australian Stock Exchange.
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2004–13 into three categories: administrative, investment, and retirement
planning. We were most concerned to discriminate calls related to retire-
ment planning from other categories of calls. Many of the topics used to
code calls were related to administrative matters. Calls related to invest-
ment matters and retirement planning were dominated by just 15–25
topics each. As such, the clustering routine was more focused on topics
at the margins of each category with low counts of inquiry than upon a
broad array of topics with high counts of inquiry. Based upon the Calinski-
Harabasz (1974) test, it was found that the optimal number of categories
was three (thereby justifying the use of the three main categories set
out above).
Figure 6.2 displays the proportion of each category on the overall volume
of calls over the period 2004–13 on a monthly and yearly basis. As shown by
the yearly representation (Figure 6.2, Panel B) the contribution of the
administrative matters category to the overall volume of calls dominates
those of retirement planning and investments over the whole period. This
is partly due to a composition effect, given the higher number of adminis-
trative issues potentially affecting participants (e.g., change of contact
details, info-kit follow up, magazine not received, etc.) with respect to a
relatively smaller number of those regarding the other topics. After the
initial setup period of the call center in 2004, both the contribution of
administrative and retirement planning calls decreased to surge again in
mid-2007 (the former) and in 2006 (the latter), thereafter declining
and then again rising, just for the administrative issues, toward the end of
the period.
Each category of calls followed much the same path over the entire
period, although the volume of calls by category differed. Notable in this
regard was a shift after 2008 in the relative level of calls related to retirement
planning and to investment matters. The peak in administrative calling
frequency in mid-2007 was related to a change in federal government policy
in relation to the tax treatment of superannuation (as shown in Figure 6.2,
Panel A). The change in policy was announced in May 2006 and imple-
mented on July 1, 2007 (Clark et al. 2014). This caused a peak in partici-
pants’ interest in June 2007 given the natural tendency to procrastinate until
the change was about to be implemented. It is also notable that the increas-
ing importance of calls related to investment matters relative to retirement
planning took place at the onset of the global ﬁnancial crisis, dominating
the retirement planning issues for the rest of the sample period.
A test for the existence of co-integration over the period 2004–13 indi-
cated that the hypothesis that the categories of advice-calling were co-
determined could not be accepted. We also sought to determine whether
the categories of calling were co-determined by the path of the Australian
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economy, using quarterly data to represent macroeconomic conditions.
A Tobit model was used to regress the percentage change in the volume
of each topic category on a set of economic variables including change in
employment, unemployment, gross domestic product, expectations of
future economic conditions, and stock market performance.
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To test whether the results were inﬂuenced by shocks occurring during the
time period, three diagnostic tests were deployed. First, residuals were plotted
vis-à-vis the time variable seeking evidence for possible outliers. These were
found for investment and retirement planning topics; indeed, the ﬁrst quar-
ters of 2009 and 2013 were unusual with respect to average values. Second,
winsorizing was used to smooth the effect of the outliers.5 Third, yearly ﬁxed
effects were introduced to control for potential effects of heteroskedasticity
induced by singular events.6 As Table 6.1 shows, the change in employment
was weakly but signiﬁcantly related to the change in the volume of calls related
to administrative and investment matters. Changes in call volume related to
retirement planning were not signiﬁcantly related to these variables, suggest-
ing participants either recognized that the global ﬁnancial crisis was of limited
signiﬁcance to Australia, or that retirement planning is a long-termmatter not
affected by short-term economic events.
To the extent that investment involves risk and uncertainty, it was
hypothesized that changes in macroeconomic conditions would prompt
reconsideration of investment strategies and their implementation. The
positive sign on the coefﬁcient (change in employment) suggests that, as
the rate of increase in employment slowed, so too did the volume of calls
related to administrative matters and investment matters. Participants
may have adopted a wait-and-see strategy rather than responded by calling
immediately for advice on either administrative or investment matters (and
thereafter, changing some aspect of their investment strategy). This is
consistent with Roy’s (1950) notion of safety ﬁrst and could be allied with
Kahneman and Tversky’s (1979) ﬁndings on loss aversion. It is also possible
that participants may have thought there was more danger in responding
quickly than in a wait-and-see strategy (O’Donoghue and Rabin 1999).
As for the sensitivity of calling in anticipation of retirement, Figure 6.3
displays the decomposition of the volume of calls into each category of
advice-seeking distinguishing by gender and age at the time of calling, for
those age 40+ (Figure 6.3, Panel A) and for those 54+ (Figure 6.3, Panel B). It
was hypothesized that the volume of calls for advice on retirement planning
would rise as participants neared the median Australian age of retirement
(represented in Figure 6.1), and this was evident in Figure 6.3. Administra-
tive calls dominated topics raised by participants in their 40s. Older cohorts
shifted their focus to retirement planning matters, particularly investment
matters. The turning point is at about age 55, when retirement planning
issues become most salient. A breakdown of the year-by-year proportion of
topics raised by those age 54+ (Figure 6.3, Panel B) conﬁrms the reduction in
the volume of calls raised on administrative matters and the increasing
salience of retirement planning.
We also examined interactions between gender, age, salary, and account
balance in terms of the topics raised in advice-seeking calls. Here, the
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objective was to check for statistically signiﬁcant differences across men and
women when raising a topic. We plot the proportion of topics raised by
gender and (i) age group, (ii) account balance, and (iii) salary, for each
topic, and t-tests were computed for each possible combination. Results
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Panel A. Five-year age cohorts, over 40
Panel B. Year-by-year, over 54 years old
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< 40 40–5
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Figure 6.3. Frequency of calls by category and age over time
Source : Authors’ elaboration on Mercer Data.
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were in line with expectations: gender differences in every case were statis-
tically signiﬁcant (1 percent level), highlighting its role in driving the
interests and attention of participants with respect to their pension plans.7
A closer look at the different topics by age showed that younger women
asked more about administrative matters, whereas older women asked more
about retirement planning. On investment matters, the proportion of men
calling for advice increased for each age cohort over age 40. This is com-
patible with Barber and Odean’s (2001) study ﬁnding that men churned
their accounts more than women did.
With respect to account balances, participants with more money in their
plans were most interested in how their future wealth would be managed
and what they could expect from retirement. Conversely, they seemed
to be less interested in administrative matters, whereas the latter were a
main concern for participants with lower account balances.8 Differences
between men and women in their propensity to call about administrative
matters declined as their salaries increased (with a marginal increase at the
highest salary interval). This was also true for calls on investment topics,
although the difference between men and women in calling propensity
was more marked than in the case of administrative matters when taking
into account average salaries over the previous ﬁve years. These results
reinforce ﬁndings that men were more engaged in investment matters
than women were.
Conclusions
In the Australian system, participation in a supplementary pension scheme
is mandatory. Most participants are auto-enrolled into a target-date fund or
similar investment vehicle. Once enrolled in an industry fund or related
commercial organization, Australian DC plan participants rarely switch
between providers; to the extent that switching takes place, more often
than not it is the result of switching employers (who may be in a different
industry with a different service provider) rather than making a choice in
favor of a preferred provider. Participant inertia is reinforced by the time
and opportunity costs involved in switching between providers and the
upfront costs of learning about other providers and their respective virtues.
Arguably, in these circumstances, service providers owe their participants a
duty of care in terms of the nature and quality of services provided.
Our study has examined advice-seeking by such participants. Of those
participants that did contact their funds, a large majority of younger parti-
cipants called about administrative matters, rather than investment matters
or retirement planning. Nevertheless it may behoove younger participants
to engage in some form of retirement planning around the age of 40, so as
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to augment or take advantage of related retirement saving products. We also
showed retirement planning advice is sought late in participants’ working
careers, perhaps too late to make an appreciable difference to their pension
beneﬁts. One way forward could be to link participants’ advice-seeking on
administrative matters to brieﬁngs on retirement planning (Thaler and
Sunstein 2008).
Our results also showed that those seeking advice on investment matters
were young and could also beneﬁt from advice on retirement planning.
These participants were often in their 40s and 50s, were more knowledge-
able of the superannuation system and the services offered by funds, and
could conceptualize the link between short-term investment considerations
and long-term pension beneﬁts. Advice on investment matters requires a
higher level of knowledge and understanding of the issues by call handlers,
so they are also subject to higher standards of certiﬁcation by Australian
authorities.
Linking advice on investment matters with retirement planning may
require the upgrading of the call handlers’ skills and, perhaps, hiring
different kinds of call handlers than those that handle routine administra-
tive matters. In practice, however, many super funds charge a fee to those
seeking advice on investment matters, on the assumption that these matters
are more complex, require higher levels of skill and expertise, and often
incur follow-up calling and material provision. The fee-for-service model
may be antithetical to engaging those active on investment issues with
retirement planning.
Call centers, web access, and mail are crude mechanisms for engaging
participants in retirement planning. In response, some employers have
brought independent ﬁnancial advisors to the workplace to counsel those
seeking investment advice and retirement planning. While there is little in
the way of published research on the value of this type of facility, experi-
ence suggests that the take-up of this type of service depends upon the fee
charged for the service, the degree to which an independent ﬁnancial
advisor is ‘independent’, and the age, gender, and incomes of employees.
Also important, though less recognized, is the provision of expert advice by
suitably qualiﬁed advisors without incurring (explicitly or by implication)
long-term commitments by the employer. Many Australian employers have,
in effect, given up responsibility for the retirement prospects of their
employees, but providing this type of untaxed ‘beneﬁt’ may well facilitate
the engagement of employees with their retirement funds.
In some cases, Australian retirement funds have taken a more proactive
stance by establishing drop-in centers in large retail parks, shopping malls,
and in towns and cities with high participant concentrations. Local adver-
tising, postcode leaﬂeting, and sponsorship of local events can help establish
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the presence of these organizations in communities. While this is likely more
effective than simply waiting for a participant to call on some matter of
immediate interest, such engagement will be most effective when fund
membership is geographically concentrated. By contrast, many of the largest
funds are multi-employer, multi-jurisdictional, and multi-industry, where
call centers, web access, and mail are the only ways to control costs and
consequences of dispersed membership. New methods are needed to
engage participants with advice that is category-speciﬁc, salient, and
future-oriented, rather than simply servicing participant-initiated inquiries.
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Notes
1. This database has been analyzed to better understand the patterns of advice-
seeking over time and in response to announced changes in pension policy and
volatility in ﬁnancial markets (see Clark et al. 2014).
2. Caplin and Martin (2011: 2899) show that individuals typically satisﬁce rather
than optimize when searching for information. As a consequence, decisions are
made without full examination of the available options indicating ‘the best
available options may be missed’. In response, individuals may outsource this
function to those with the requisite skills and expertise and/or seek the advice
of those they trust.
3. Superannuation funds have an interest in retaining fund participants (those that
call and those that don’t), especially those with large account balances. There are
economies of scope and scale in the global funds’ management industry.
4. The regulatory framework governing the provision of ﬁnancial advice in Australia
is complex, subject to overlapping and cross-cutting legislation and regulations,
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and politically contested (see Hanrahan 2013; Latimer 2014; Serpell 2012).
Further, debate about the proper provision of advice often focuses on distinctions
between types of advice that the average person ﬁnds difﬁcult to understand
(Lindgren 2013).
5. Extreme values were capped to the 99th percentile (see Tukey 1962).
6. Plots of the residuals and full tables of the econometric results are available upon
request.
7. These results and related graphs are available upon request.
8. We show, for the UK, that as a person’s income rises and retirement account
grows, this dependence on workplace pensions as the main source of future
income declines. Furthermore, we show that the nature and number of a person’s
savings instruments change markedly. This is pronounced for higher-income
male participants (see Clark et al. 2012). Here, we were unable to observe the
other types of savings instruments available to participants.
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